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Cross-Cultural Factors and Corporate Governance 
Transparency in Global Airline Strategic Alliances
by Catherine C. Giapponi and Carl A. Scheraga
This	paper	argues	that	a	critical	dimension	in	understanding	the	factors	that	inhibit	the	effectiveness	
and	benefits	of	airline	alliances	is	corporate	transparency.		Specifically,	the	issue	of	transparency	in	
corporate	governance	is	considered.		Corporate	governance	is	the	set	of	institutional	arrangements	
affecting	corporate	decision	making,	and	deals	with	the	relationship	among	various	participants	in	
determining	the	direction	and	performance	of	corporations.		
However,	 airline	 strategic	 alliances	 span	 an	 array	 of	 national	 cultures	which	 influence	 the	
development	of	such	relationships.		The	impact	of	national	culture	as	a	determinant	of	governance	
transparency	is	also	investigated	in	this	paper.		This	study	draws	on	the	literature	which	examines	
the	impact	of	national	culture	on	international	joint	ventures	and	governance	systems.	 	National	
cultures	 are	 described	 by	Hofstede’s	 five	 dimensions	 of	 power	 distance,	 uncertainty	 avoidance,	
individualism,	masculinity,	and	temporal	orientation.
Governance	 transparency	 is	 investigated	 by	 the	 examination	 of	 corporate	 annual	 reports.	
Thus,	this	study	investigates	not	only	the	level	of	corporate	governance	transparency	demonstrated	
by	 participants	 in	 each	 of	 the	 three	 major	 airline	 alliances,	 but	 the	 relationship	 between	 said	
governance	transparency	and	the	cultural	identity	of	each	of	the	participants.		
INTRODUCTION AND FOCUS OF CURRENT STUDY
Strategic alliances have become an increasingly important part of the corporate strategic planning 
process.  Within the international airline industry, the 1990s witnessed the emergence of three global 
multi-carrier alliances: Star, oneworld, and Skyteam.  These three alliances are comprised of airlines 
spanning numerous national cultures.  However, while these alliances have been successful in 
achieving incremental revenue enhancements, they have been less so with regard to the achievement 
of economic synergies through cost cutting.  This study provides an integrated framework for 
understanding the organizational drivers of these economic synergies, specifically those associated 
with corporate governance transparency.  The rationale for focusing on these specific drivers and 
their importance is discussed here in detail.  Furthermore, the impact of specific characteristics of 
national cultures on corporate governance transparency is empirically tested.  
A recent study by the Boston Consulting Group done by Cools and Roos (2005) provided a 
sobering prognostication regarding the future of strategic alliances in the airline industry.  Strategic 
alliances in this industry were a response to regulatory and cultural barriers that inhibited airlines 
from pursuing merger and acquisition strategies that were consistent with the economic logic of 
consolidation.  High fragmentation in the airline industry had resulted in excess capacity and poor 
economic performance.  Consolidation would have provided several opportunities.  First, operational 
synergies provide opportunities for cost rationalization.  Second, network synergies can reduce costs 
and improve asset utilization.  Finally, consolidation can provide platforms for future growth.
Because of the regulatory and cultural barriers noted above, airlines have pursued the alternative 
strategy of global alliances.  Consumers have directly benefited from these alliances through 
increased frequency of flights, better connectivity between destination points, and the consolidation 
of frequent flyer programs.  The Boston Consulting Group study suggests, however, that the extra 
revenue that has resulted from these consumer benefits has been almost fully realized or “harvested” 
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(Cools and Roos 2005, 18).  The study notes that while cost cutting is long overdue, the alliances 
have not been effective in facilitating tougher cost synergies.  
The study also notes four major reasons for the inability of airline strategic alliances to provide 
further consolidation in the industry.  First, there are asymmetric benefits to airlines that make the 
initial investments necessary for cost synergies.  That is, there is no guarantee that “the airline 
that invests the most will receive the greatest benefits” (Cools and Roos 2005, 19).  Thus, airlines 
are hesitant to make these investments.  Second, such investments represent a commitment to an 
alliance that is irreversible.  Airlines perceive this as a reduction in strategic flexibility even though 
such flexibility has been used to justify the logic of strategic alliances.  Again, airlines are hesitant to 
make the necessary investments.  Third, a significant engagement in a strategic alliance is often seen 
as erosion in option value.  Company executives have less freedom to choose alternative strategies 
in shaping the destinies of their airlines.  Finally, the effectiveness of global strategic airline alliances 
has been hampered by cumbersome decision making.  Often, every airline in an alliance has an 
equal vote regardless of size or importance.  Thus, operational consolidations have typically been 
bilateral in nature, involving only two members of an alliance rather than all members.
The strategy of collaboration is often perceived as having significant costs that may outweigh any 
possible benefits.  Whipple and Frankel (2000) suggest that the most important factors influencing 
the success of alliances are trust, senior management support, and the ability to meet performance 
expectations, clear goals, and partner compatibility.  Koza and Levin (1998), as well as Whipple 
and Frankel (2000), argue that different alliance partners have different views on trust and what it 
entails.  Mutual trust is best fostered when the structure of an alliance closely supports the intent 
of the alliance.  Thus, alliances must be carefully and thoroughly planned and controlled so that 
trust and defined boundaries are not violated (Spekman et al. 1998; Whippel and Frankel 2000). 
Participants in an alliance being formed must agree to the contribution of each member and the 
sharing of profits.  This is not always easily accomplished because the reality is that every firm has 
specific, if not idiosyncratic, objectives that it wishes to achieve (Lewis 1990).  Therefore, alliance 
members must have a clear understanding of what each of them needs to invest in the strategic 
alliance as well as what each can expect in return.  In addition to a commonality of goals among 
strategic alliance participants, there must also be compatibility of corporate cultures (Spekman et 
al. 1998).
This latter point is more specifically addressed in a model proposed by Simon and Lane (2004). 
They argue that the existence of shared complementary resources between strategic alliance partners 
is not sufficient to allow for alliance effectiveness.  In addition to these resources, the factors that 
allow the employees of alliance members to interact with each other in order to share, combine, and 
leverage such complementarities are critically important.  In defining these factors, they focus on 
differences in organizational, professional, and national culture.  They suggest that the “more salient 
the cultural differences are to the value-creating activities of an alliance, the more disruptive those 
differences will be on the alliance’s value-creating activities” (Simon and Lane 2004, 315).
The discussion below will illustrate how the concept of netchains, which incorporate the 
attributes of supply chains and networks, can be used to describe airline strategic alliances.  However, 
the work done by Larson (1992) is critical to this study.  She found that strategic alliances, which 
by nature are networks, have critical factors for success beyond economic incentives and mutually 
beneficial strategic rewards.  These include a history of prior personal relations and knowledge of 
network partners’ reputations that lead to a commitment to a mutual orientation.  Such an orientation 
requires knowledge of potential partners’ businesses and a respectful understanding of the interests 
of others.   
Spekman et al. (1998) suggest that strategic alliance cooperation occurs at the boundaries of 
each of the alliance participants.  If the firm is the total set of inter-structured activities in which it is 
engaged and over which it has discretion to initiate, maintain, or end behaviors, then the boundary of 
the organization is located where its discretion ends and that of another begins.  Thus, one can also 
define the boundary of the strategic alliance itself.  This definition establishes the “permeability” 
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between firms, that is, the extent to which members of the strategic alliance allow skills, information, 
and technology to flow from one firm to another,
Lewis (1990) argues that these alliance boundaries, which mark the points of contact among 
strategic alliance participants, are characterized by two phenomena: formal and informal interfaces. 
Formal interfaces include the control and reporting mechanisms that structure inter-firm interactions. 
These mechanisms may include the structuring of boards of directors and other management 
personnel, the content of equity agreements, contracts joint development agreements, and the 
execution of operational integration.  At the same time, informal interfaces, as noted by Spekman et 
al. (1998, 759), “reinforce personal commitment and trust, provide access to personal information 
and contacts, and foster the development of informal networks that allow managers to accomplish 
various tasks at different levels of the organization.”
For all of the reasons noted above, this study argues that corporate transparency among strategic 
alliance partners is critically important.  We use the definition of corporate transparency developed 
by Bushman et al. (2004).  Corporate transparency is the availability of firm-specific information to 
those outside the firm.  Specifically, the study focuses on the dimension of corporate transparency 
embraced by corporate governance disclosure.  Corporate governance is the set of institutional 
arrangements affecting corporate decision making, and deals with the relationship among various 
participants in determining the direction and performance of corporations (Monks and Minnow 
1995).  Corporate governance transparency directly impacts relationship transparency – a concept 
of considerable interest in the supply chain management literature.  Relationship transparency can 
be defined as an individual party’s subjective perception of being informed about relevant actions 
and properties of the other party in the interaction (Eggert and Helm 2003). Greater relationship 
transparency in a strategic interaction leads to more favorable behavioral intentions on the part of 
participants in such an interaction.
Governance transparency is investigated by the examination of corporate annual reports.  The 
latest available reports of all the members of the three major airline alliances – Star, oneworld, and 
Sky Team – are utilized.  There is analytical precedent for this approach (see Bushman, Piotroski, 
and Smith 2004).  An extension of the conceptual and measurement scheme utilized by Bushman et 
al. (2004) is employed in this study.  Furthermore, the seminal work by Gray (1988) and subsequent 
research has demonstrated a relationship between a country’s cultural profile as measured by 
Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions and the level of disclosure/transparency in the annual corporate reports 
of firms in that country.  The importance of cross-cultural factors is discussed in detail below.   Thus, 
this study investigates not only the level of corporate governance transparency demonstrated by 
participants in each of the three major airline alliances, but the relationship between said governance 
transparency and the cultural identity of each of the participants.  
NETCHAINS AND TRANSPARENCY
The two concepts of netchains and transparency are very relevant to a description of the 
interrelationships found in strategic alliances in the airline industry.  Lazzarini, Chaddad, and Cook 
(2001, 7) define a netchain as a “set of networks comprised of horizontal ties between firms within 
a particular industry or group, such that these networks (or layers) are sequentially arranged based 
on the vertical ties between firms in different layers.”  Suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, and 
customers typically represent these different layers, linked by supply chains.  Furthermore, “netchain 
analysis explicitly differentiates between horizontal (transactions in the same layer) and vertical ties 
(transactions between layers), mapping how agents in each layer are related to each other and to 
agents in other layers.”
There are sources of value in netchains, as discussed by Lazzarini, Chaddad, and Cook (2001), 
which are much akin to the sources of value in airline strategic alliances.  The supply chain aspects 
of netchains underpin the advantages of airline strategic alliances that are traditionally discussed 
in the literature. Supply chain analysis focuses on production and optimization. Supply chain 
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structures also help to optimize transactions costs that are incurred when using the market system. 
Not surprisingly, airline strategic alliances have focused on economies of scale, increased traffic 
density, and economies of scope, as well as the improvement in service quality and convenience.
Of more interest to the current study are the network aspects of netchains that have value 
impacts on organizations with regard to social structure, learning, and network externalities.  In the 
first case, networks give rise to a social structure, which influences individual or collective behavior, 
and by extension, performance.  This social structure influences the resources that accrue to an 
individual or group because of their location in the network (Adler and Kwon 1999, 4).  
The discussion in the literature as to the optimal structure of networks, which are most likely 
to yield social structure benefits, has divided itself between proponents of “dense” networks and 
those of “sparse” networks.  Dense networks are defined as those where network members are 
extensively connected with each other (Coleman 1990) and have repeated, relational exchanges 
(Nelson 1989; Krackhardt 1992). Such dense networks promote trust, the development of social 
norms, and resultant cooperation.  In addition, intra-industry coalitions may emerge that possess 
the power to negotiate better terms of trade with firms in other industries or netchain layers as 
well as modifying the degree of competition within coalition industries (Pfeffer and Nowak 1976; 
Galaskiewicz 1985; Lane and Bachmann 1996). 
Proponents of sparse networks with weak ties and occasional market-like transactions between 
organizations suggest that such relationships generate new information and diversity, both of which 
are critical for generating innovations that create benefits and opportunities for members of the 
network.  The “looseness” of these relationships is important in that the temptation to be “locked 
into” resources which are highly specialized and may be of only temporal value (Grabher 1993; 
Uzzi 1997; Afuah 2000). 
Additionally, networks provide opportunities for learning.  Membership in a network allows 
for the sharing of specific and specialized knowledge developed by individual organizations, thus 
creating the diversity of information noted above (Demsetz 1988; Zenger and Poppo 1999).  Learning 
in a network may also give rise to “co-specialization.”  The process of co-specialization reflects the 
combining of individual capabilities of network members to develop network-wide routine practices 
(Nelson and Winter 1982; Kogut and Zander 1992).  However, co-specialization may, as in the 
case of dense networks, lead to a reduction in the opportunities that can be exploited by individual 
network members and may inhibit their ability to react to new external knowledge (Leonard-Barton 
1995).
Finally, network externalities may provide “increasing returns to adoption” (Katz and Shapiro 
1985; Arthur 1989).  Network externalities provide the opportunity for such an effect in both a direct 
and indirect manner.  Direct increasing returns to adoption occur when the adoption of a technology 
or process by multiple organizations allows for increased benefits for all users.  Furthermore, greater 
adoption of a technology or process allows for more experience to be gained with that technology 
leading to greater improvement in said technology or process.  Indirect increasing returns to adoption 
occur when the technologies, products, or processes of network members can be used together, that 
is, they exhibit complementarities. 
An example of an area of technological concern for airline alliance partners, as noted by 
Cools and Roos (2005), which lends itself to the benefits of increasing returns to adoption, is 
information technology.  They observed that information systems, even among alliance partners, 
are still fragmented, idiosyncratic, and backward.  Consolidation would benefit all alliance partners. 
Yet, such consolidation has not made significant progress.  Another area that would benefit from 
increasing returns to adoption is that of joint procurement with regard to high cost items, such as 
aircraft and spare parts, or more mundane items, such as food and fuel. 
Hofstede (2003, 18) defines transparency in a netchain as “the extent to which all the netchain’s 
stakeholders have a shared understanding of, and access to, the product-related information that they 
request, without loss, noise, delay and distortion.”  Loss occurs when a netchain participant does not 
transmit information, while noise implies that a netchain participant adds non-relevant data to the 
0
Global Airline Strategic Alliances
body of accumulated information.  Delay occurs when a netchain participant delays information, 
and distortion implies that a netchain participant changes information either by accident or on 
purpose.  He further notes that a precondition for netchain transparency is a shared understanding 
that may include: a shared language, shared interpretation of key concepts, shared standards for 
product quality, shared reference information models, and shared technological infrastructure.
Transparency allows the netchain to be more responsive to (unanticipated) external events. 
Again, Hofstede (2003, 18) notes that increased responsiveness allows producers to anticipate market 
demand accurately; netchain participants to plan their capacity accurately; netchain participants to 
readily perceive defects in quality control and to readily identify the source of such problems; and 
customers to identify the quality- and value-related attributes of a product or service.
NATIONAL CULTURE AND TRANSPARENCY
Hofstede (2003) provides an interesting discussion of the relationship between national culture 
and network transparency.  His father (Hofstede 1980; Hofstede and Bond 1988) empirically 
derived five dimensions of culture: individualism versus collectivism, power distance, masculinity 
versus femininity, uncertainty avoidance, and short-term versus long-term orientation.  Numerous 
replication studies utilizing these dimensions have established their validity and reliability (see 
Sondergaard 1994).  Furthermore, these dimensions have found widespread use in many areas of 
behavioral and organizational research.  In recent research, his cultural dimensions have been related 
to perspectives on and determinants of business ethics (Schepers 2006; Su 2006; Smith and Hume 
2005; Swaidan and Hayes 2005), consumer decision-making and advertising (Mikhailitchenko and 
Whipple 2006; Bang, Raymond, Taylor, and Moon 2005; Leo, Bennett, and Hartel 2005; Malai 
and Speece 2005; Yoo and Donthu 2005), new product development (Garrett, Buisson, and Yap 
2006; Dwyer, Mesak, and Hsu 2005), international negotiations (McGinnis 2005; Rammal 2005), 
joint ventures (Ritchie and Eastwood 2005), management control (Garg and Ma 2005; Lere and 
Portz 2005), information technology (McCoy, Everard, and Jones 2005), total quality management 
(Jabnoun and Khafaji 2005), industrial relations (Black 2005), leadership (Littrell and Valentiri 
2005), and incentive preferences (Rehu, Lusk, and Wolff 2005). 
The individual in an individualistic culture is independent; so too are organizations in such a 
culture.  A market model governs networks with transactions regulated by contracts or informal 
deals, but with no ulterior motives to a particular transaction.  Collectivist cultures would view 
networks as extended families.  Individuals in these networks are bound to each other by life-long 
links of loyalty and obligation, and there is no need for contracts.  There is a clear distinction 
between the in-group and the out-group.  While netchains may be reconfigurable in individualistic 
cultures, they are typically not so in collectivistic ones.  Providing information to members of the 
out-group is seen as morally wrong.  Lying is not necessarily seen as inherently problematic.  It 
is acceptable, in fact, morally acceptable, to favor friends over others even though this might be 
labeled as corruption in individualistic cultures.
Cultures of high power distance also provide a problematic environment for netchains.  In such 
cultures, delegation of authority is problematic which, in turn, impedes transparency.  Providing 
information to third parties not controlled by senior authorities may not be acceptable.  Transparency 
in netchains requires strategic alliance partners to yield some of their autonomy, which may be 
difficult in rigid hierarchies.  
Feminine cultures would be more likely to capitalize on the social and learning structures of 
netchains.  In such cultures, talking is preferred over fighting and cooperation is preferred over 
competition.  Masculine cultures, by contrast, favor fierce competition with a basic distrust held 
between individuals.  Leader firms in a strategic alliance would seek to dominate less dominant 
partners in the alliance.
Cultures that demonstrate high uncertainty avoidance exhibit a preference for strict dogmas and 
principles.  For organizations in such cultures, rules are important as is strict adherence to tradition. 
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Cooperative relationships, therefore, may exhibit conflict over agreements and exceptions.  Low 
uncertainty avoidance cultures will have no problem changing deadlines and contracts in response 
to situational changes.  Finally, organizations in cultures with a short-term orientation pursue short-
term returns, as opposed to those realized in the long run.  Long-term agreements are thus fragile, 
often replaced by transactions in short-term spot markets.   
NETCHAINS AND AIRLINE STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
Oum et al. (2000) provide an extensive discussion of the reasons for airline strategic alliances. 
These include the expansion of seamless service networks, traffic between alliance partners, cost 
efficiencies, the improvement of service quality, co-marketing advantages, and the reinforcement of 
market power with cooperative pricing.  As suggested above, these motivations represent the supply 
chain aspects of netchains.  
It was also noted that of greater interest to this study were the network aspects of netchains. 
Doganis (2001) points out that airline agreements fall along a spectrum that ranges from interline 
agreements, or joint frequent flyer programs, to joint ventures, where partners come together to 
operate a business.  KLM has been particularly active in the latter area.  In 1998, KLM and Alitalia 
announced their intent to operate their passenger and cargo services as two integrated joint ventures. 
More recently, KLM and Air France have consolidated their operations through the first large 
international merger of two airlines.  The two airlines are owned by a common parent/holding 
company, Air France-KLM; but, at the same time, will retain and operate under their own brand 
names from their home bases of operation in Paris and Amsterdam.  The new holding company 
will be managed by the joint structure of the Strategic Management Committee, consisting of four 
French and four Dutch members.
Doganis (2001) further points out that airline strategic alliances fall along a similar spectrum. 
The simplest alliances, covering a limited number of routes or city pairs, involve special pro-rate 
(the prices airlines agree to charge for carrying each other’s passengers) agreements and/or code 
sharing.  At the other end of the spectrum are the global alliances that include schedule coordination, 
joint sales offices and ground handling, combined frequent flyer programs, and joint maintenance 
activities.  Sometimes such alliances include mutual equity stakes.  Global strategic alliance 
partners may also have regional alliances, thus making the global alliance a very complex structure. 
Ultimately, global strategic airline alliances may move towards franchising, common branding, joint 
cargo and passenger services ventures, and, finally, full mergers.  To facilitate such undertakings, 
airlines will need to understand the network aspects of netchains in order to fully exploit the benefits 
of these opportunities.  
THE USE OF CORPORATE ANNUAL REPORTS
Stanton and Stanton (2002) provide a comprehensive overview of the use of corporate annual reports 
in the research literature.  Corporate annual reports are the means by which companies communicate 
with their various constituencies and stakeholders.  However, they are more than simply formal 
documents that are produced in response to mandatory corporate reporting requirements.  Hopwood 
(1996, 55) suggests that corporate annual reports have the main purpose of constructing a “particular 
visibility and meaning” as opposed to “what was there.”  In discussing financial accounting, Hines 
(1988, 257) elaborates on this notion: “We create a picture of an organization, or the ‘economy’, 
whatever you like, and on the basis of that picture (not some underlying ‘real’ reality of which no 
one is aware), people think and act.  And by responding to that picture of reality, they make it so; it 
becomes ‘real in its consequences.’ And what is more, when people respond to that picture, and the 
consequences occur, they see it as proof of our having correctly conveyed reality.”
Thus, as Stanton and Stanton (2002) argue, researchers use corporate annual reports to view the 
“visibilities and meanings” noted by Hopwood above.  Anderson and Imperia (1992), Bekey (1990), 
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and Neu et al. (1998) provide interesting examples of how corporate annual reports communicate 
the personality and philosophy of the firm, market the firm, and present a particular organizational 
image.  Stanton and Stanton (2002) compile a detailed listing of the perspectives in annual reports 
that have been studied by researchers.  These include image management, marketing, organizational 
legitimacy, political economy, and accountability.  More specifically, there may be an inherent 
tension between the presentation of corporate legitimacy and social responsibility and that of 
political economy and image management and marketing.  Keasey and Wright (1993) argue that 
this tension between perspectives affects the quality of communication with regard to accountability 
and governance.
The use of annual reports for studies related specifically to disclosure has been well documented. 
Botosan (1997, 329) states that “although the annual report is only one means of corporate reporting, 
it should serve as a good proxy for the level of voluntary disclosure provided by a firm across 
all disclosure avenues.”  Lang and Lundholm (1993) note that annual report disclosure levels are 
positively correlated with the amount of disclosure provided via other media.  Knutson (1992, 7) 
states that “at the top of every analyst’s list (of financial reports used by analysts) is the annual 
report to shareholders.  It is the major reporting document and every other financial report is in some 
respect subsidiary or supplementary to it.”  Patel and Dallas (2002, 6) suggest that the use of annual 
reports “facilitates analysis and comparison of companies around the globe.”   
Gray (1988) has developed a framework that links Hofstede’s dimensions of culture and the 
development of accounting systems, the regulation of the accounting profession, and attitudes 
towards financial management and disclosure.  He suggests four accounting value dimensions that 
influence a nation’s financial reporting practices.  These are: professionalism versus statutory control, 
uniformity versus flexibility, conservatism versus optimism, and secrecy versus transparency.  This 
last dimension is of particular interest to this study.  Gray (1988, 8) defines secrecy as “a preference 
for confidentiality and the restriction of disclosure of information about the business only to those 
who are closely involved with its management and financing as opposed to a more transparent, open 
and publicly accountable approach.”  Furthermore, he hypothesizes (p. 11) that the higher a country 
ranks in terms of uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and masculinity, and the lower it ranks in 
terms of individualism, the more likely it will rank high in terms of secrecy.
High uncertainty avoidance implies a preference for secrecy because of the need to restrict 
information disclosures in order to avoid conflict and competition.  A high ranking on power 
distance, associated with the need to preserve inequalities in power, would also be consistent with 
a preference for secrecy.  A collectivistic orientation with a sense of responsibility to insiders, as 
opposed to those external to the firm, would also be consistent with secrecy.  Feminist cultures that 
emphasize the quality of life, people, and the environment will tend to be more transparent with 
regard to information.
RESEARCH DESIGN
 A qualitative analysis of the intensity of governance disclosure was conducted through the 
examination of the most recent corporate annual reports filed by the full members of the three 
major airline alliances, Star, oneworld, and SkyTeam.  The Star Alliance members examined in 
the study included Air Canada, Air New Zealand, ANA, Austrian, LOT Polish Airlines, Lufthansa, 
SAS, Singapore Airlines, South African Airlines, Swiss, TAP Portugal, Thai, United, U.S. Airways, 
and Varig.  It should be noted that annual reports for two members of the Star Alliance, Asiana 
and BMI, were not available.  These companies were, therefore, excluded from the research.  The 
members of the oneworld Alliance included in the study consisted of Aer Lingus, American Airlines, 
British Airways, Cathay Pacific, Finnair, Iberia, LAN, and Qantas.  The SkyTeam Alliance members 
studied included Aeroflot, Aero Mexico, Air France, Alitalia, Continental, Czech Airlines, Delta, 
Korean Air, and Northwest Airlines.  The airlines in this study and their ICAO designators are listed 
in Table 1. 
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For purposes of the study, governance transparency was defined as the disclosure of governance 
information that can be used to hold executives/officers, boards of directors, and majority owners 
accountable to investors, stakeholders, and the public.  Governance transparency, therefore, was 
measured based on the specific disclosure of information related to corporate executives, board of 
directors, and shareholders provided in each company’s annual report, or 10K when issued in lieu 
of an annual report.  The measurement framework is an extension of the governance transparency 
variables used in research conducted by Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) and Christopher and 
Hassan (2005).  The list of disclosure items adopted for purposes of this study was extended to include 
additional governance attributes identified in the Patel and Dallas (2002) study of transparency and 
disclosure. A total of 29 disclosure items were used (see Table 2 for a complete list).  Each company 
was rated based on the actual disclosure of each piece of information (see Tables 3A, 3B, and 3C). 
They were categorized into two groups: those that disclosed 50% or more of the governance items 
and those that disclosed less than 50% of the items.  The 50% criterion was utilized as this was the 
intra-group division suggested by the data.
The relationship between Hofstede’s cross-cultural factors (1980) and governance disclosure 
was examined using the Tukey-Kramer method (Tukey 1953; Kramer 1956).  The fifth factor of 
time orientation was not included because the Hofstede-Bond (1988) study provided data for only 
23 countries, which represented a very small sub-sample of the strategic alliances.  In the current 
study, the problem of testing differences in means was complicated by the fact that the sub-samples 
were of unequal size. These unequal cell sizes required that an extension of the test proposed by 
Tukey (1952, 1953) be used. The original Tukey test (1952) was designed specifically for pair-
wise comparisons based on the studentized range and controls the maximum experiment-wise error 
rate (MEER) when the sample sizes are equal.  Tukey (1953) and Kramer (1956) independently 
proposed a modification for unequal cell sizes.  The Tukey-Kramer method, as used in this study, has 
fared extremely well in Monte Carlo studies (Dunnett 1980). Additionally, Hayter (1984) provides 
a proof that the Tukey-Kramer procedure controls the MEER.
Specifically, for two groups y
i
 and y
j
, with  n
i		
and	n
j
 observations in each group respectively and 
s being the root mean square error based on ν degrees of freedom, their means and are considered 
significantly different by the Tukey-Kramer criterion if:
where q(α;κ,ν) is the α-level critical value of a studentized range distribution of κ independent 
normal random variables with ν degrees of freedom.  The software utilized is the GLM (General 
Linear Model) procedure in SAS (2002), which calculates significance for the Tukey-Kramer 
statistic at the 5% level.       
RESULTS 
The intensity of governance disclosure varied across companies and across airline alliances. 
Disclosure was strongest among the members of the oneworld Alliance, with 88% of the members 
achieving a disclosure rate of over 50% (see Table 4).  The Star Alliance ranked second in terms 
of overall governance disclosure, with 67% of its members disclosing over 50% of the governance 
information.  SkyTeam had the lowest overall ranking, with 56% of its members disclosing over 50% 
of the governance items.  SkyTeam is the youngest of the airline alliances, launched in 2000, two 
years after the founding of oneworld and three years after the launch of Star Alliance. Governance 
transparency is one dimension of corporate transparency and, given the importance of transparency 
in building strong alliance relationships, SkyTeam’s low disclosure rate may prove problematic.      
Table 4 also displays Hofstede’s (1980) indices for each of the four dimensions of uncertainty 
avoidance (UA), power distance (PD), individualism (IND), and masculinity (MAS).  High 
values for each of these four indices would indicate a national culture characterized by high 
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Table 1: Airline Alliances Members and ICAO Designators
Airline ICAO Designator
Aeroflot AFL
Aer Lingus EIN
Aeromexico AMX
Air Canada ACA
Air France AFR
Air New Zealand ANZ
Alitalia AZA
All Nippon Airways ANA
American Airlines AAL
Asiana AAR
Austrian Airlines AUA
British Airways BAW
Cathay Pacific Airways CPA
Continental Airlines COA
Czech Airlines CSA
Delta Airlines DAL
Finnair FIN
Iberia Airlines IBE
Korean Airlines KAL
LAN LAN
LOT Airlines LOT
Lufthansa DLH
Northwest Airlines NWA
Qantas Airways QFA
Scandinavian Airlines SAS
Singapore Airlines SIA
South African Airways SAA
Swiss International Airlines SWR
TAP Air Portugal TAP
Thai Airways THA
United Airlines UAL
US Airways USA
Varig VRG
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Table 2: Governance Items
No. Annual Report:
Executive	Background	and	Compensation
1 Identifies top executives
2 Provides background/biographical information on the top executives
3 Lists the outside company boards on which the executives serve
4 Discloses executive remuneration (compensation, salary, bonus, etc.)
Board	Composition,	Structure,	and	Processes
5 States/describes board role/responsibilities. (and also committee responsibilities)
6 Lists board of directors’ individual members
7 Provides background/biographical information on the individual board members
8 Indicates board member company affiliation
9 Lists the other company boards on which the board member serves
10 Specifies required independence with regard to the directors (members of board)
11 Identifies which board members are independent
12 Specifies a required number of board members, or range. (i.e. 10-12)
13 Discloses board member remuneration
14 Lists the board committees
15 Identifies the individual members serving on those committees
16 Discloses the number of committee meetings actually held
17 Discloses the percentage of committee members who actually attended the meetings
18 Discloses the number of committee meetings actually attended by each individual board 
committee member
19 Discloses the number of full board meetings actually held
20 Discloses the percentage of board members who actually attended the meetings
21 Discloses the number of board meetings actually attended by each individual board 
committee member
22 Specifies the procedures for the election of Board members
Ownership	Structure	and	Investor	Relations
23 Provides information on investor and shareholder relations, including corporate contact 
information
24 Discloses information on the ownership, distribution, or stock options provided to board 
members and/or executives
25 Identifies the shareholders with largest stock ownership
26 Identifies external auditors
General	Governance
27 Contains a section clearly identified as “Governance”
28 Indicates where the company stock is traded
29 Specifies the authority upon which corporate governance is based
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Table 3A: oneworld Alliance 
Governance Items Provided (1 = item provided, 0 = item not provided)
EIN AAL BAW CPA FIN IBE LAN QFA
Item 2005 2005 10K 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005
1 1 1 1* 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1* 1* 1* 0 0 1*
3 0 1 1* 1* 0 0 0 1
4 1 1 1 0 1* 1* 1* 1
5 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 1 1 1 1 0 1*** 0 1
8 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
9 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
10 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
11 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
12 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
13 1** 1 1 1 1 1** 1 1
14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
16 1**** 1 1 1**** 1 0 1 1
17 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 1**** 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
19 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
20 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
21 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
22 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
23 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
24 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
25 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
26 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
27 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
28 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
29 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
*Information only provided on executives serving on the Board of Directors
**Remuneration information provided in aggregate, not individually
***Information not provided on all Board members
****Information not provided for all committees
*****State Auditors
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Table 3B: Skyteam Alliance
                 Governance Items Provided (1 = item provided, 0 = item not provided)
AFL AMX AFR AZA COA CSA DAL KAL NWA
Item 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005• 2005 2005 10K• 2005 2005 10K•
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
2 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
3 0 0 1 1* 0 1 1 0 1
4 1* 0 1 0 0 1** 0 0 0
5 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
8 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
11 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
12 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
13 1 0 1 1 0 1** 0 0 0
14 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
15 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
16 1**** 0 1 1**** 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
19 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
20 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
21 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
22 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
23 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
24 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
25 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
26 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1***** 0
27 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
28 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
*Information only provided on executives serving on the Board of Directors
**Remuneration information provided in aggregate, not individually
***Information not provided on all Board members
****Information not provided for all committees
*****State Auditors
•Continental directs investors to a website for information on corporate governance and boards.
•Delta directs investors to a website for information on corporate governance and boards.
•Northwest directs investors to a website for additional information on governance and the 
restructuring under Chapter 11.
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Table 3C: Star Alliance
                  Governance Items Provided (1 = item provided, 0 = item not  provided)
ACA ANZ ANA AUA LOT DLH SAS
Item 2005 2005 2005 2005 2004 2005 2005
1 1 1* 1 1 1 1 1
2 0 1* 0 1 0 1 1
3 0 1* 0 0 0 1 1
4 0 1* 0 1 1** 1 1
5 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
8 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
9 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
10 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
11 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
12 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
13 0 1 0 0 1** 1 1
14 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
15 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
16 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
18 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
19 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
21 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
22 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
23 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
24 0 1 0 1* 0 1 1
25 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
26 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
27 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
28 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
29 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 3C: Continued
SIA SAA SWR TAP THA UAL USA VRG
Item 2004 2005 2004 2004 2005 2005 10K 2005 2004
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1* 1 0 1 1 0 0
3 1* 1* 1 0 1 1 0• 0
4 1 1 1** 0 1** 1 1 0
5 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1*
7 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
8 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
9 1 1 1 0 1 1 0• 0
10 0 1 1 0 1 1 0• 0
11 1 1 1 0 1 1 0• 0
12 0 1 0 1 1 0 0• 0
13 1 1 1** 1** 1 1 1 0
14 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
15 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
16 1**** 1 1 0 1 0 0• 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0• 0
18 0 1 0 0 1**** 0 0• 0
19 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
21 0 1 0 0 1 0 0• 0
22 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
23 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
24 1 1 1** 0 0 1 1 0
25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
26 1 1 1 1 0***** 1 1 1
27 1 1 1 1 1 0 0• 0
28 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
*Information only provided on executives serving on the Board of Directors
**Remuneration information provided in aggregate, not individually
***Information not provided on all Board members
****Information not provided for all committees
*****State Auditors
• Information required by this item will be set forth in IS Airways Group’s definitive Proxy 
Statement under the captions ‘Information About the Company’s Board of Directors and 
Corporate Governance,’ ‘Executive Compensation,’ ‘Employment and Other Executive 
Agreements,’ and “Compensation Committee Interlocks and Insider Participation” in the 
definitive Proxy Statement and is incorporated by reference into this Annual Report on 
Form 10-K (USS Airways Group, Inc. Annual Report 2005, p. 269).
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Table 4: Disclosure and Cross-Cultural Factor Ratings (Hofstede) 
  Uncertainty Avoidance, Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity
Airline UA/PD IND/MAS DISCL. GROUP
ONEWORLD
EIN 35/28 70/68 1
AAL 46/40 91/62 1
BAW 35/35 89/66 1
CPA 29/68 25/57 1
FIN 59/33 63/26 1
IBE 86/57 51/42 2
LAN 86/58 23/22 1
QFA 51/36 90/61 1
SKYTEAM
AFL NA NA 1
AMX 82/81 30/69 2
AFR 86/68 71/43 1
AZA 75/50 76/70 1
COA 46/40 91/62 2
CSA 74/35 58/45 1
DAL 46/40 91/62 1
KAL 85/60 18/39 2
NWA 46/40 91/62 2
STAR
ACA 48/39 80/52 2
ANZ 49/22 79/58 1
ANA 92/54 46/95 2
AUA 70/11 55/79 1
LOT 74/51 56/60 2
DLH 65/35 67/66 1
SAS 34/27 71/9 1
SIA 8/74 20/48 1
SAA 49/49 65/63 1
SWR 58/34 68/70 1
TAP 94/59 21/25 2
THA 64/64 20/34 1
UAL 46/40 91/62 1
USA 46/40 91/62 1
VRG 76/69 38/49 2
Group 1: Disclosure of 50% or more of the governance items
Group 2: Disclosure of less than 50% of the governance items
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uncertainty avoidance, high power distance, strong individualistic qualities, and a strong masculine 
orientation.    
Table 5 presents a non-parametric test of the means of Hofstede’s cross-cultural factors (1980) 
and the two disclosure groups: those that disclosed less than 50% and those that disclosed more 
that 50% of the governance information.  The findings indicate that the intensity of disclosure is 
negatively correlated with uncertainty avoidance and power distance, with statistical significance at 
a 5% level.  Airlines from countries that ranked higher in uncertainty avoidance and power distance 
disclosed less governance information.  This supports Gray’s (1988) hypothesis that countries 
ranking higher in uncertainty avoidance and power distance will rank higher in secrecy.  Although 
the correlations between disclosure and the dimensions of individualism and masculinity were not 
statistically significant, the findings indicate that the direction of these relationships support Gray’s 
(1988) hypothesis that countries ranking lower in terms of individualism, and higher in terms of 
masculinity, will rank higher in terms of secrecy.  Airlines from countries that ranked higher in terms 
of individualism and lower in masculinity disclosed more governance information.  
Table 5: Non-parametric Test of Means (Tukey Methodology) of Cross-Cultural Factors
               Majority versus Less-Than-Majority Disclosure 
               (Majority = Disclosure of 50% or More of Governance Items)
UA PD IND MAS
Majority 52.43** 42.43** 65.14 54.24
Less-than-Majority 72.90** 55.00** 52.20 55.50
** = Statistically significant at 5% level
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The results of the study indicate that the intensity of governance disclosure varies across alliances 
and within each alliance.  Although oneworld and Star Alliance presented greater intensity of 
governance disclosure than SkyTeam in the aggregate, there was substantial variation within each 
airline alliance.  Perhaps governance disclosure may not be recognized, early on, as being as important 
in the selection of airline network alliance members as other variables.  Shared complementary 
resources (Simon and Lane 2004) or more formal knowledge of a partner’s reputation (Larson 1992) 
may be more important drivers.   Yet, as noted above, governance information that is disclosed to the 
public and investor community is very much related to transparency in the netchain (Hofstede 2003) 
that is product and operationally focused.  Thus, it appears that governance disclosure becomes 
increasingly important in the long-term development of strong and successful alliance relationships. 
A potential extension of the research, therefore, is a longitudinal study that assesses the changes 
in transparency and intensity of governance disclosure prior to and following entry into one of the 
major alliances.  In addition, future research that compares the productivity of the alliances systems 
and the retention of alliance members might also shed light on this dimension of the issue.  
The study reveals the absence of common governance disclosure standards not only across 
the airline alliances, but across national borders.  Although there is growing interest in developing 
global governance standards, such as the principles developed by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD 2004), there are fundamental differences that inhibit easy 
adoption.  The structure of corporate ownership, for example, varies across national borders and 
international regions.  Significant family control and government ownership of publicly traded firms 
impact the shape of governance systems (Claessens et al. 1999; Arsalidou and Wang 2005).  State 
ownership, in particular, renders Western governance mechanisms ineffectual (Mar and Young 2001) 
and may inhibit transparency (Tam 1999).  In addition to corporate ownership and national cultural 
differences, formal institutions, including national law, regulations, and trading exchange rules, 
also impact corporate governance disclosure (Licht et al. 2005; Santema et al. 2005).  Disparities 
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in corporate transparency may also result from differences in institutional arrangements linked to 
business systems, such as emerging market, Anglo-American, and communitarian systems (Millar 
et al. 2005).  It is clear, therefore, that the variation in governance disclosure among the airline 
companies is the result of broad and complex contextual differences.               
A significant finding of the study is that national culture impacts corporate governance disclosure 
in the airline industry.  It highlights the importance of understanding the role cultural factors play 
in corporate transparency as it impacts the evolving relationships in the airline alliance networks. 
This study focused on governance transparency, and did not explore financial or strategic disclosure. 
Future research in the study of both financial and strategic transparency in the airline alliances 
affords opportunities to gain a more complete understanding of corporate transparency in airline 
alliance systems, as well as the impact of national culture on financial and strategic disclosure.  
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